


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DIRECTORATE OF  
INTELLIGENCE

# *WEEKLY SUMMARY*

## *Special Report*

*Conference on Security and Cooperation  
in Europe: Overture*

State Dept. review  
completed

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
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# Conference on security and cooperation in Europe



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On 22 November, representatives of East and West European states plus the US and Canada will gather in Helsinki to begin preparations for the first general conference on European security affairs since World War II. In fact, what are normally considered "security" issues will be taken up only marginally at the security conference; these matters will be discussed largely in East-West talks on mutual and balanced force reductions. Security conference preparations are the product of some 18 years of on-and-off campaigning by the Soviet Union. The campaign was designed to gain international acceptance of the division of Germany, the post-war European borders, and the Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe. For years, a major obstacle to the conference was the unwillingness of the West Germans to acknowledge what most of the other states of Western Europe had accepted: that

neither East nor West could change the post-war status quo. Once Bonn was willing to acknowledge this, as it did in a bilateral non-use of force treaty with the Soviets, a major source of Western opposition to the conference was removed.

The important question now is what impact the conference itself will have on longer term Eastern and Western objectives. The Soviets hope that, in addition to winning confirmation of the post-war status quo, they can capitalize on differences between the US and its European allies in order to lessen US influence on European affairs while increasing their own. The Soviets would like also to minimize the chances that Western Europe will choose to create a political and military "third force" on their western flank. The East European states share the Soviet desire to ratify the post-war European borders, but at the same time would like to expand their contacts with the West, hoping to expand trade and, ideally, lessen their political and economic dependence on the Soviet Union. The West hopes to take advantage of this East European desire for greater flexibility and expand East-West cooperation while also protecting the unity of the Western Alliance and the integrity of the European Community.

The Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe itself could open in the middle of 1973. It is unlikely to conclude in obvious failure, because none of the participants would see their interests thus served. The outcome will not be totally one-sided, although the long-term impact on European affairs is not likely to be discernible for many years. Even then, it may be difficult to separate the influence of the conference from the larger process of East-West conciliation.

#### Curtain Time

Multilateral preparatory talks will open in Helsinki on 22 November. Moscow probably would like to wind up preparations before Christmas, while the West will try to extend them into 1973. The date for beginning the conference itself will be decided during these talks. It is anticipated that the target date of June 1973 set by Moscow will be met. The location of the



Proposed Helsinki Site for Conference

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conference will also be determined during the multilateral preparations. The Soviet Union supports the Finnish bid to host the conference, but the US and other NATO allies want to observe how the Finns perform during the preparatory stages to determine whether Helsinki will be sufficiently "neutral."

The delegations to the preparatory talks will for the most part be headed by principal officers of the participants' diplomatic missions to Helsinki. Most delegations, therefore, will be headed by ambassadors; most of them will be supported by experts from home. The two Germanies will be represented, at least initially, by the heads of their respective trade delegations in Helsinki—also backed by experts from home. One criterion making Helsinki acceptable to the West was that East and West German participation would be equal but not on a par with that of the other participants, so that Pankow's claim to sovereignty would not be gratuitously reinforced. This rationale is less important now that Bonn has initialed a general treaty with Pankow. Moscow, possibly hoping to take advantage of this, has hinted in recent weeks that it wants to send a representative who outranks its ambassador in Helsinki.

The security conference itself will involve at least the foreign ministers of the countries involved. Moscow would like the final session of the conference to be at the "highest level." The Western allies remain uncommitted on this point, preferring to wait to see whether conference results warrant a summit gathering.

#### The Conference Format

The Soviet Union would like to conduct the conference in three stages. Following the preparatory talks, the foreign ministers would meet in the first stage and appoint working groups. These groups would develop, in the second stage, the texts of agreements. The third stage would be a summit meeting to approve the agreements. This approach is essentially the same as the French have advocated—except that the French see the third stage as another gathering of foreign ministers and not as a summit. Most of our European allies support the three-stage French approach.

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#### PERSPECTIVES

*The positive changes which have taken place recently in Europe do not mean that problems inherited from WWII have been fully solved. What must be undertaken in order to continue the improvement in the European situation is to move forward in the matter of providing collective security in Europe, in the development of cooperation both on a bilateral and on an all-European basis. An improvement in the situation in Europe as a whole could be served by calling an all-European conference.*

Soviet Party Secretary Brezhnev's report to the 24th CPSU Congress, 30 March 1971

*If such a conference is carefully prepared and will address substantive issues, the United States favors it.... It is not enough to agree on cooperation in the abstract. How will cooperation be implemented in practice? Will it include freer intercourse among the European peoples, East and West? How would a conference promote economic relations other than through existing institutions and means?*

25X1 President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to Congress, February 1972

The US, on the other hand, has advocated lengthy preparatory talks, possibly including the appointment of working groups, followed by a single meeting of foreign ministers. In this scenario, the preparatory talks would develop the texts of agreements for the foreign ministers to sign.

It appears likely that decisions by consensus will govern the preparatory talks and the conference itself, though the West may argue for taking votes on purely procedural questions. The Finns will chair the preparatory talks, but the

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chairman will not be a member of the Finnish delegation to the talks.

### The Conference Origins

The preparatory talks for a security conference are a culmination of years of patient effort by the Soviets and their allies. Since 1954, when the Soviets first proposed the conference, the idea has had its ups and downs, but seldom seemed close to acceptance. The proposal seemed to be gaining some momentum by 1968, but the invasion of Czechoslovakia set it back.

The relative brevity and mildness of the Western reaction to the invasion encouraged Moscow to revive the idea in March 1969. The Western allies, most as yet unconvinced that the Soviets were seriously committed to a policy of detente in Europe, set out to test Moscow's sincerity. The NATO countries, at US urging, imposed various "linkages" or preconditions—in particular, the Four-Power agreement on Berlin—without which conference preparations could not begin. Soviet party chief Brezhnev's close personal association with detente proposals helped to persuade many Western skeptics that Moscow's espousal of detente was more than a temporary tactic.

By May of this year the Soviets had fulfilled the various preconditions. Many Western allies were by then convinced of the merits of a conference—particularly given West Germany's Ostpolitik and the US-Soviet dialogue. Thus, after 18 years, the US and the USSR agreed on a sequence in which preliminary talks would begin on 22 November in Helsinki and, assuming a satisfactory conclusion, the actual conference would begin in mid-1973. It was also agreed that talks on mutual and balanced force reductions would proceed in a similar fashion, but with preliminaries starting in January 1973, and the actual negotiations in the fall. The two sets of talks would be in sequence, giving the West a chance to test Soviet intentions in respect to force reduction before opening the security conference at the foreign minister level.

The Soviets still apparently see mutual force reduction talks as a potential threat to a suc-

cessful security conference. The original NATO force reduction proposals were intended in part to counter Soviet security conference proposals. When Soviet silence on force reductions became increasingly incompatible with Brezhnev's detente program and even threatened to block the security conference, Brezhnev reversed his field and, in May 1971, announced Soviet readiness to discuss force reductions. Since then, the problem has been to relate the two subjects in a way satisfactory to the proponents of each.

There has always been a question whether the Soviets' interest in mutual force reductions is sincere or whether they regard acceptance of talks on the subject as merely a necessity to ensure the security conference. Whatever their feelings about the merit of force reductions as such, there is no doubt that the security conference has priority in their eyes. The Soviets have not reneged on their commitment to discuss force reductions, but they have done everything possible to give the security conference precedence. Soviet diplomats at one point suggested an approach under which force reductions would be handled by a body set up by the security conference, thus making force reductions subordinate in both time and status. Moscow's advocacy of short, non-controversial preliminary and negotiating sessions of the security conference is based on the hope that security conference matters will be successfully concluded before the equivalent stages of mutual force reductions get under way.

### Soviet Objectives

The persistent Soviet push for a European conference is rooted in the special historical circumstances of the post - World War II period. In contrast with the situation after the Napoleonic Wars and World War I, there has been no general conference to define power relationships in the wake of World War II. The Soviets at first keenly felt the lack of a legal endorsement of their gains. As time went on, however, the probability of forcible change in European boundaries has faded, and the Soviets have now acquired formal acceptance from West Germany—the state for many years deemed the most likely to challenge the boundaries. Thus, from Moscow's perspective,

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the conference has lost some of its original meaning. But, while this was going on, other motives began to emerge.

For one thing, Moscow has come to feel a need to adjust to and perhaps mold the new order emerging in Europe. In particular, the growing strength and unity of Western Europe and its enduring attractiveness to Eastern Europe is seen by the Soviets as a potential threat to Moscow's interests. The failure of the Soviets previous policy of confrontation inspired them to turn to a more conciliatory approach. The Soviet dispute with China likewise encouraged Moscow to seek stability on its western flank. Some Soviet commentators have linked Western opponents of the security conference with the [ ] Chinese.

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The more fluid and subtle strategy of detente presents Moscow with risks as well as opportunities. The Soviets appear confident that they can manage the risks and turn the conference to their advantage. The tightly controlled Soviet diplomatic and information apparatus was ideally suited to conduct a persistent, plodding campaign for a security conference against Western opposition and indifference. But in the give-and-take of actual negotiations, the apparatus may be less effective.

A threat to Moscow's control in Eastern Europe is an inevitable concomitant of detente in general and the security conference in particular. Just as some Western countries see a security conference as a chance to pry away barriers to the East, some of their Eastern counterparts look upon the conference as an opening through which will blow fresh breezes from the West. Poland has hinted at its willingness to take a more liberal position on the freer movement issue. Romania has made no secret of its hope that the conference will produce a declaration of principles that will demolish the Brezhnev doctrine. Moscow, aware of this, has sought to preserve its position by stressing the need for greater bloc unity and coordination as the conference approaches.

Years of incessant Soviet propaganda have made it appear that the conference is an end in itself, but it remains only one aspect of the over-

all Soviet policy in Europe. In the view of the Soviet leadership, the conference represents the culmination of a lengthy process of development, almost a reward for their good behavior since 1968. Looking ahead, they see the conference as opening the way to further detente achievements. Failure of the conference would set back Moscow's policy, but would not necessarily mean its abandonment. Brezhnev's prestige, which has been heavily committed to the security conference, would suffer if the conference cannot be billed as a clear success.

### Western Objectives

The Western allies, forced to react to the repeated Soviet conference proposals, began by searching for areas in which the Soviet desire to hold the conference could be used to gain Soviet concessions. In a sense, the conference has already served the West tactically by putting pressure on the Soviets to reach a Four-Power accord on Berlin. For the conference itself, two positive objectives have come to be shared by most of the allies. They hope to encourage East European foreign policies more independent of the Soviet Union and East European internal policies with more individual freedom. The allies also hope to

### CONFERENCE INVITEES

#### NATO:

- |            |                |                  |
|------------|----------------|------------------|
| 1. Belgium | 6. Iceland     | 11. Portugal     |
| 2. Canada  | 7. Italy       | 12. Turkey       |
| 3. Denmark | 8. Luxembourg  | 13. UK           |
| 4. France  | 9. Netherlands | 14. US           |
| 5. Greece  | 10. Norway     | 15. West Germany |

#### WARSAW PACT:

- |                   |            |            |
|-------------------|------------|------------|
| 1. Bulgaria       | 4. Hungary | 6. Romania |
| 2. Czechoslovakia | 5. Poland  | 7. USSR    |
| 3. East Germany   |            |            |

#### NON-ALIGNED

- |            |                 |                 |
|------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| 1. Albania | 6. Lichtenstein | 10. Sweden      |
| 2. Austria | 7. Malta        | 11. Switzerland |
| 3. Cyprus  | 8. San Marino   | 12. Vatican     |
| 4. Finland | 9. Spain        | 13. Yugoslavia  |
| 5. Ireland |                 |                 |

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expand practical areas of cooperation with the East and, in the process, to reap economic benefits.

In a less tangible area, many Western allies and neutrals share another objective. They see the US and the Soviet Union moving toward a less-antagonistic relationship, a new association epitomized by the Moscow summit. They favor this trend, but they want to participate in it, both politically and economically. The security conference offers them an opportunity to play at least a small role in a process intimately related to their interests. Many of the smaller allies are feeling domestic economic and political pressures for them to increase momentum to detente and thus provide a rationale for decreased defense expenditures. They are motivated to work for a successful conference.

The West has some defensive goals as well, notably to preserve the unity of the Western alliance and protect the integrity of the European Community. The NATO allies have prepared their positions for the conference during extensive consultations over the past year, attempting to formulate conference goals and tactics to encompass their sometimes disparate and conflicting national objectives. They will enter the preparatory talks with agreements among themselves on a vast number of issues. Nevertheless, just as the conference process may produce some centrifugal tendencies in the East, so will Western unity be tested. The French are the most likely source of difficulties.

As much as any other ally, the French hope to encourage independence and liberalization in Eastern Europe. If the price for such relaxation is a lesser cohesion in the Western bloc, Paris, unlike most other allies, might be willing to pay that price. Indicative of this inclination is France's claim that it will not join a NATO caucus during conference preparations, even though it is prepared to participate in a caucus of the nine members of the European Community when matters affecting the community arise. In practice, France will stay in close touch with its NATO allies through consultations in the North Atlantic Council in Brussels. But the French are leaving

themselves free to take independent initiatives without prior consultation.

Bonn, too, has a vested interest in the conference which it sees as a complement to Brandt's Ostpolitik. Bonn, under the Social Democrat - Free Democrat coalition, sees a need for close Western cohesion until the detente process develops much further. A Christian Democrat government would also adhere to close Western coordination, but would probably pursue a different set of objectives than the Brandt coalition. The Christian Democrats, for example, would be much more concerned about the East Germans' anticipated attempts to portray attendance at Helsinki as their debut on the European political scene, although the Christian Democrats may not be able to do much about it.

#### The Conference Agenda

The most important task of the multilateral preparatory talks will be to establish an agenda for the conference itself. The agenda debate will uncover the varied and often contradictory Eastern and Western objectives and should provide some indication of what results the conference may be expected to produce.

The NATO allies have identified four general topics they would like included on the conference agenda: relations among states; military security; freer movement; and cooperation in economic, scientific, and technological areas. They would hope to use the subject of state relations to challenge the so-called Brezhnev doctrine. They would attempt to do this through conference declarations upholding national sovereignty, the inviolability of national borders, and the non-use of force.

Under the item on military security, the allies would hope to point to some of the threats to stability in East-West relations and possibly to negotiate some agreements that could engender greater mutual confidence in each other's intentions. The West would try to win agreement on prior announcement of major military maneuvers and troop movements and exchanges of observers at military exercises. Some allies want to go

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beyond these measures to give the conference a more extensive military-security content. They would prefer that the conference discuss a mutual limitation of forces and possibly issue a joint declaration on mutual and balanced force reductions. Motivated by a concern that the Soviet Union will not negotiate seriously in separate talks on mutual force reductions, they think something should be worked out at the security conference, where the West's leverage is enhanced by the Soviet desire for a successful conference. The US, the USSR, and France strongly oppose consideration of detailed military security measures at the conference. The US is concerned that such discussions would prejudice Western positions during force reduction talks. Moscow does not want such detailed and potentially difficult considerations to delay or block the conference. And France opposes the very concept of mutual force reductions.

All the Western allies agree that one agenda item should involve an attempt to push for a more liberal Eastern approach to the movement of people, ideas, and information. The allies differ still on tactics. A number feel that the terminology "freer movement" is too provocative and are convinced that the Soviet Union will reject such an agenda item out of hand, thereby denying the West an opportunity to obtain practical

improvements in this area. The US has argued that the West should not give up this terminology before the bargaining has begun. In any case, all the allies hope to achieve an increase in bilateral exchanges in the fields of education and tourism and an expansion of traditional cultural exchange programs.

The fourth subject the West wants on the agenda—cooperation in the economic, scientific, and technological areas—promises to contain the greatest potential for successful negotiation. Economically, the allies hope to promote East-West trade through balanced and reciprocal concessions. Particularly, they hope to discuss cooperation in the development of natural resources, joint manufacturing projects, improvement of access to markets, and financial cooperation in the funding of East-West projects. The West will trade on the Eastern desire to obtain Western science and technology in order to obtain better access to Eastern markets. The allies also hope to expand cooperation in the environmental area.

Soviet agenda proposals, naturally enough, reflect Moscow's interest in a smooth, non-controversial conference which, while tidying up after World War II, creates mechanisms through which Moscow can have a larger say in European

### PROPOSED CONFERENCE TOPICS

#### EAST

- The guaranteeing of European security and the principles of relations between the states in Europe;
- "Cooperation"—extension of trade, economic, scientific-technical, and cultural relations on the basis of equality;
- Creation of a permanent body for consideration of questions on security and cooperation in Europe.

#### WEST

- Questions of security, including principles governing relations between states;
- Certain military aspects of security;
- Freer movement of people, ideas, information, and cultural affairs;
- Cooperation in economic, scientific, technical, and environmental fields.

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affairs. The Soviet agenda would have just three items: security and principles of relations among states; cooperation; and creation of a permanent post-conference organ. Under the security item, the Soviets apparently would like to move to a conference declaration on the inviolability of frontiers and non-use of force, thus giving "legal" endorsement to the existing boundaries in Europe and to Soviet hegemony in the East. The status of East Germany would be enhanced, and reunification with West Germany made even more remote, yet without antagonizing West Germany.

Under "cooperation," the Soviets envision declarations on the expansion of trade, economic, scientific, technological, and cultural relations. Whereas the West will attempt to press the freer movement issue, Moscow undoubtedly will try to restrict conference consideration to cooperative projects and government-controlled cultural exchanges. By lumping "cultural relations" with agenda items on other types of cooperation, the Soviets hope to reduce the likelihood of conflict over freer movement.

The third Soviet item embodies their concept that the conference should not be a one-shot affair, but should establish permanent machinery that would "institutionalize" the results. The Soviets hope that they would be able to use such a forum as an instrument to influence future developments in Western Europe, particularly to undermine NATO and the European Community.

The various neutral and non-aligned participants in the conference are all likely to find acceptable a de facto recognition of post-war borders. They would also welcome any weakening of the Brezhnev doctrine. They are also likely to support and want to participate in the various "cooperative" aspects of the conference. On questions of military security, they will be inclined to support extensive discussions of military security measures, for the simple reason that none of them will be involved in talks on mutual force reductions.

Few initiatives are expected from the non-aligned states, but those that are advanced could make an important impact on the conference. The Swiss, for example, may propose a European system of arbitration and peaceful settlement of

disputes. This may be considered by the conference. Spain would like the conference to take up Mediterranean security. The Austrians and the Yugoslavs may want to introduce the question of the Middle East and the role of the superpowers in the Mediterranean—a subject not likely to gain much support from either side.

### Outlook

It is unlikely that the preparatory talks will be as short or as non-controversial as Moscow wants. Diplomatic formalities, opening speeches, questions of procedure, and the holiday season in addition to potentially prolonged discussions of the agenda ensure that the preparatory phase will extend into 1973. The talks may not finish before March, thus ensuring an overlap with the beginning of talks on mutual and balanced force reductions in January. The varying Eastern and Western expectations for the security conference promise some hard bargaining on the agenda items, particularly should the West push for substantive discussions in the preparatory talks.

None of the participants will want to come away from the conference empty-handed. There are areas, however, where East and West may not be able to find complete agreement—for example, aspects of "freer movement." In other areas, results not completely satisfactory to either side will have to be accepted; for example, in the formulations concerning principles of state relations. There are other questions, particularly in the area of cooperation, on which the participants will find more than sufficient ground for agreement.

Whatever agreements are reached, it is misleading to expect the conference to produce a new security system for Europe. The conference will barely touch on questions of military security. NATO, the Warsaw Pact, CE/MA, and the EC are likely to remain virtually unchanged after the conference. The conference, nevertheless, could set the tone and provide the starting point for the next phase of East-West relations in Europe. In this sense, there are as many uncertainties for the East as there are for the West, and equal requirements for caution as they enter this period.

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